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The tangle of colonial modernity: Hong Kong as
a distinct linguistic and conceptual space within
the global common law
Christopher Hutton
Introduction
Hong Kong, or more formally, the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (SAR), is a common law jurisdiction within the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Hong Kong was officially a British colony
from 1843 to 1997, although colonial rule began in practice in
1841. Post-1997 Hong Kong is unusual in that it is a common law
jurisdiction within a civil law state, the legal system of which was set
up initially on the Soviet model. The People’s Republic of China is a
unitary state under one party rule, and no power can be permanently
ceded from the centre. Hong Kong is therefore a zone of discretionary
exception created under the ‘one country, two systems’ policy, albeit
one buttressed by an international agreement, the Sino-British Joint
Declaration of 1984, and formalised in the Basic Law. A striking
feature of this constitutional arrangement is that it is time-bound. The
‘high degree of autonomy’ promised to Hong Kong expires on June 30,
2047, with the subsequent special status of Hong Kong, if any, yet to
be determined.
This paper begins with an account of the fictional ideal of the
linguistic and conceptual unity of the common law. It moves on to
review aspects of Hong Kong’s legal history, focusing on tensions
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in the unfolding of Hong Kong’s colonial modernity. These tensions
between the cross-jurisdictional conceptual unity of the common law
and the recognition of Hong Kong’s culturally distinct status are then
illustrated through a number of cases. In particular, Hong Kong’s
distinctiveness is up for discussion in two classes of legal decisions.
The first represent classic instances of ‘legal pluralism’, involving the
application of principles of Chinese customary law by the Hong Kong
administrative authorities (in particular through the district officer
system) and the courts. These cases involve what are understood as
traditional Chinese social institutions, family structures, forms of
marriage, adoption and intergenerational possession and transmission
of property. Linguistic and conceptual parity between the mainstream
common law and traditional Chinese culture is not presumed, and the
correct translation and anthropological interpretation of key cultural
concepts is at issue. The second class of cases is much more nebulous.
This is where courts in the course of a common law judgment explicitly
evoke the different nature of Hong Kong society and its ‘Chineseness’,
for example in relation to the definition of basic terms such as wife
and woman.
1 The ideal conceptual unity of the common law
The fundamental principle of common law interpretative practice
is the so-called ‘plain meaning’ or ‘ordinary meaning’ rule. Ordinary
words and their everyday meanings operate as the default setting of
the common law, and law’s departures from ordinary meaning must be
justified by specific elements of legal culture (Hutton 2014: 41).1 The
common law understands itself as an essentially universal jurisdiction,
in that it is not tied to local conditions or conceptual micro-worlds.
This (quasi-)universal jurisdiction is also the domain of the English
language, which, at least from the perspective of the centre, is largely
co-extensive with it.2 By ‘English language’ is meant in this context
neither a sociologically identifiable variety nor an ethnically defined
mother tongue. Rather ‘English’ represents a legal Esperanto, a set
of assumptions about the language of the common law, namely that
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it possesses definitional stability, conceptual transparency, universal
applicability and the ability to carry and sustain the coherence of legal
reasoning across multiple contexts of application. It represents an ideal
form of English which exists in uneasy relation to its sociologically
messy, ill-defined real world analogue, the English language.

It follows that the common law understands itself to be transparent
between jurisdictions, in the sense that these are in constant dialogue
and exchange. This conversation between different (autonomous or
semi-autonomous) legal systems and their different sub-domains,
operates centripetally, in part because of centres of authoritative decision
making (such as the Privy Council, the United Kingdom Supreme
Court, the United States Supreme Court) and in part because this
dialogue is anchored in the historical legacy of the common law and
its fundamental reservoir of cases, principles and modes of reasoning.
In its essence the common law is held to stand unchanging outside
the historical contexts of its application, though it may paradoxically
be adapted to those contexts: ‘The Common Law may develop but it
cannot change’ (Chan Wei-keung v R per Huggins J, 846).
The inter-jurisdictional dialogue is, of course, not one between
equals: for example the Hong Kong courts were, in general, bound
by decisions of the House of Lords and the Privy Council before the
end of colonial rule in 1997 (Wesley-Smith 1988: 191; 215). In the
twenty-five years before 1997 the Hong Kong courts consistently drew
on English cases for over 70% of their citations, with around 20% being
from Hong Kong (Wesley-Smith 1999).
In addition to this cross-jurisdictional dialogue, there exists the
presumption of a linguistic-conceptual world that is shared between
the domain of law and the society over which it governs. The ideal of
the comprehensibility of law, was expressed in a statement by CozensHardy MR in Camden (Marquis) v Inland Revenue Commissioners (647):
I thought that a modern Act of Parliament was framed in a language which
is intelligible to everybody, and which applied not to any local custom or
consideration of that kind, but to the whole of Great Britain (and I think
beyond that, elsewhere, but at any rate to the whole of England).
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This statement blurs the universal applicability of law, in that it
is held to apply universally within its jurisdiction (and to disregard
matters of local practice or belief) with the principle of its universal
intelligibility. The hesitation about the geographical boundaries of this
jurisdiction reflects the fact that it is a purely imagined or ideal domain
– it is not possible to make it precise sociologically or sociolinguistically.
Few ‘ordinary people’ can read an Act of Parliament and gain an
accurate sense of its legal effect. The actual sociological boundaries of
this (idealised) English are impossible to determine, but, in this fictional
or ideal sense, it is possible to imagine a judge knowing the language
completely. Baron Martin expressed this in the form of a rhetorical
question: ‘is not the Judge bound to know the meaning of all words in
the English language; or if they are used technically or scientifically, to
inform his own mind by evidence, and then to determine their meaning?’
(Hills v The London Gaslight Co, per Baron Martin, 63).

The presumption of conceptual universality operates unseen as a
foundational fiction of law. In practice, it is a rebuttable presumption,
once conceptual difference is explicitly at issue in a particular case. If
one looks at the history of a jurisdiction like Hong Kong, this ideal
of a conceptually unified common law comes very sharply into focus,
and, on occasion, the fiction breaks down or is set aside as a matter of
policy. So while historically, much of the explicit work of Hong Kong
legal culture has been the fine-tuning of the relationship between the
wider common law, in particular the law of England and Wales, and
the legal culture of Hong Kong, a deeper unstated assumption has been
at work that the basic conceptual resources of the English language
constitute a shared and stable backdrop to both jurisdictions. Words
of ordinary English (such as person, man, woman, child, wife) are taken
for legal purposes as having the same meaning in Britain and Hong
Kong, as are basic legal terms of art such as contract, trust, equity, mens
rea. These terms are held to be part of the conceptual world of both
the original jurisdiction and its colonial transplant.
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2 Too much or too little?
The question of whether Hong Kong has been, fundamentally, a
Chinese society under a thin veneer of colonial administration, or
whether it is better characterised as a cosmopolitan (quasi-) city-state
run on free trade principles, runs through the entirety of Hong Kong’s
legal and social history. It has commonly been argued that while Hong
Kong is ‘a modern city’, the Chinese population is westernised only
in a ‘superficial sense’ (Wong 1986: 307; Hsu 1992: 51). Even on the
city-state model, it has been argued that traditional Chinese family
structures, with their ‘capacity to mobilise seed capital and to provide
emergency funds’ and ‘a favourable regulatory framework’ which
encouraged risk-taking underlay the economic success of Hong Kong
(Cullen 206: 43). British colonial rule placed Hong Kong outside the
social and economic reforms of Republican China (founded 1911)
and beyond the reach of the radical communist modernity of the
People’s Republic (founded 1949). Nonetheless Hong Kong has been
understood as modern in the sense that it is ‘westernised’, with that
modernity being primarily understood as economic, administrative
and juridical (the ‘rule of law’).

This problematic colonial modernity leads to two contrasting
criticisms of British colonialism. For some, colonialism is seen as having
imposed ‘too much modernity’, for example, by introducing or imposing
forms of modernity that go beyond the provision of administrative and
economic order to operate directly on the private sphere. Such critics
generally speak on behalf of an (essentialised) traditional Chinese
culture. Colonial rule in Hong Kong is seen as a channel for inauthentic
westernisation and for the imposition of alien moral values, including
liberal individualism. Alternatively, British rule in Hong Kong has
been seen as wrongly denying its subjects access to ‘full’ modernity,
as represented by equality before the law and the rights and political
freedoms granted to citizens of modern democracies. The colonial
Hong Kong government on this view conspired with the local Chinese
(patriarchal) elite to deny progressive reforms to Hong Kong society.
The criticism of ‘too much modernity’ in the domain of language politics

225

Hutton

targets the colonial imposition of English; the criticism of ‘too little
modernity’ points to the denial of equal access to English in a socially
stratified education system.
3 One territory, two legal cultures
The original seizure of Hong Kong was accompanied by two
proclamations (Lewis 1983: 348-9). The first was issued on February
11, 1841 by Commodore Bremer as Commander-in-Chief and
Captain Elliott as Plenipotentiary. It was addressed to the ‘Chinese
inhabitants’ and included the pledge they would be
secured in the free exercise of their religious rights, ceremonies, and
social customs and in the enjoyment of their lawful private property
and interests. They will be governed, pending Her Majesty’s further
pleasure, according to the laws, customs and usages of the Chinese
(every description of torture excepted) by the elders of villages, subject
to the control of a British magistrate.

The second, issued by Captain Elliott and dated February 2, 1841,
renewed the pledge that the ‘natives of the island of Hong Kong’
would be ‘governed according to the laws and customs of China,
every description of torture excepted’. In addition, ‘British subjects
and foreigners residing in, or resorting to, the island of Hong Kong,
shall enjoy full security and protection, according to the principles and
practice of British law’. In spite of their uncertain legal status (WesleySmith 1995), the Hong Kong courts have, on occasion, treated these
pronouncements as foundational statements (HKSAR v Ma Wai Kwan,
David & Others).

There were a series of precedents for this dual system, including an
1807 Charter of Justice for Penang. Under this, and a subsequent 1826
Charter for Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, the Chinese inhabitants
of British settlements were guaranteed protection for their religious
beliefs and social customs, though ‘the extent to which English law
was modified to pay this respect to local usages was unclear’ (Freedman
1979: 94). Hong Kong, unlike the Straits colonies, had been part of
the Qing Empire, and the term ‘Chinese customary law’ covers both
226

The tangle of colonial modernity

the formal rules of imperial Qing law and local customs and usages
attested in particular regions or lineages. Early Hong Kong laws set
out a framework for two parallel systems, but again theory and practice
were unclear. An Ordinance to Regulate Summary Proceedings before
Justices of the Peace (1844) ‘provided that Chinese offenders were to be
punished according to Chinese usage’ (Norton-Kyshe 1898: 20). The
Supreme Court Ordinance (1844) affirmed that ‘the law of England
shall be in full force in the said Colony of Hong Kong, except where
the same shall be inapplicable to the local circumstances of the said
Colony, or of its inhabitants’. It stressed the primacy of property rights
in the new colony and the indivisibility of its sovereignty:
provided nevertheless, that in all matters and questions touching the
right or title to any real property in the said Colony, the law of England
shall prevail, and that no law shall be recognized in the said Colony,
which shall in any way derogate from the sovereignty of the Queen
of England (cited in The Queen v Wong King Chau and Others [1964]
HKDCLR 94, at 101).

These founding statements envisaged a ‘dual prospective system of
law’ (Ho Tze Tun v Ho Au Shi and others: 79; Cheung 1996: 69), albeit in
an unequal and unstable relationship. According to the legal historian
Norton-Kyshe (1898: 19), the decision to institute this dual system
was not without controversy. ‘Public opinion’, i.e. that of Europeans
in the colony, saw it as ‘ill-judged and impolitic that Chinese residents
should be amenable to their own laws and usages’ (Norton-Kyshe 1898:
19). The argument was that although ‘the large bulk of the population
was Chinese and mostly of the worse class, still the British laws were
admirably suited to their necessities and fully adequate to all their moral
and social exigencies’. The policy which had been applied elsewhere
of guaranteeing ‘the maintenance of the laws, franchise, and customs,
besides the official use of the languages, of conquered countries’ was
a ‘capital error’. There existed ‘an English patois which was regularly
taught in schools and was spoken by thousands in Hongkong’. This
was ‘of immense value’; further, it was the wish of ‘the intelligent
classes of the Chinese to know more of use and of our institutions’.
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These natives should be encouraged to adopt ‘our customs, manners,
and language’, and this could only be effected ‘by making all residents
in Hongkong amenable to British laws, and to none other whatsoever’
(Norton-Kyshe 1898: 20). This was in effect a debate about the degree
to which, at least as far as the law was concerned, British colonialism
in Hong Kong should take the form of what was later termed ‘indirect
rule’ (see Ho 2006).
Norton-Kyshe’s evocation of high-minded debate about the
appropriate system of law for the Chinese residents somewhat
misrepresents the inchoate and often chaotic and racist nature of the
early Hong Kong legal system, in particular the criminal law. While
some Chinese residents responded positively to the possibility of a
legal system that treated Europeans and Chinese equally (as opposed
to the handing over of Chinese offenders to Qing officials), the reality
was that the magistracy system was overburdened, marred by a lack
of competent interpreters, and juries of Europeans decided the fate
of Chinese defendants (see Munn 2001; 2013). In any case this ‘dual
system’ aspect of Hong Kong’s legal pluralism diminished with time,
very rapidly so in relation to the criminal law (Cheung 1996). What
survived was Chinese customary law in relation to family structures,
property and inheritance. The legal position was set out in the section
5 of the Supreme Court Ordinance (1873):
Such of the laws of England as existed when the Colony obtained a
local legislature, that is to say, on the 5th day of April, 1843, shall be
in force in the Colony, except so far as the said laws are inapplicable to
the local circumstances of the Colony or of its inhabitants, and except
so far as they have been modified by laws passed by the said legislature.

By the subsequent Application of English Law Ordinance (1966),
it was affirmed that: ‘The common law and the rules of equity shall
be in force in Hong Kong - (a) so far as they are applicable to the
circumstances of Hong Kong or its inhabitants; (b) subject to such
modifications as such circumstances may require’ (section 3).
The acquisition by lease of (what became) the New Territories under
the 1898 Convention of Peking was accompanied by a set of concessions
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in relation to the established way of life of its inhabitants. The
Convention contained assurances that there would be no expropriation
of land and that any resumption of land would be compensated at a fair
price (Wesley-Smith 1998: 320-1). Subsequently, the New Territories
Ordinance (1910, section 13) provided: ‘In any proceedings in the High
Court or the District Court in relation to land in the New Territories,
the court shall have power to recognise and enforce any Chinese custom
or customary right affecting such land’. A government report affirmed
that Chinese customary law (rather than Qing statutory law) governed
questions of land in the New Territories (Wesley-Smith 1998: 128,
[Strickland Committee] 1953: 17). The descendants of the villagers
registered at the time of the British take-over are to this day treated
as indigenous inhabitants. This status is accompanied by various legal
privileges. These include innovations by the colonial government, such
as the right of male indigenous villagers to be allocated land for the
building of a ‘small house’ (丁屋). This policy was formalised in 1972
(Chiu 2006). In addition the indigenous population enjoys exemptions
from certain planning laws and from registration for clan bodies under
the Companies Ordinance (Cheung 1996: 74-5). The special position
of the indigenous population is protected by Article 40 of the Basic
Law (see Chan 2011).
4 The colonial time-lag
In the colonial era, the decision whether or not to copy UK legislation
(and whether and how it should be modified) was highly indicative
of the political reading of the socio-cultural differences between the
UK and Hong Kong. The time-lag was in part a matter of practicality,
in that Hong Kong was able to draw on the UK process of legislative
reform and drafting. It was also a delay in the transplantation of human
rights, in that the post-1945 colonial government could not without
self-contradiction apply the full range of internationally-understood
democratic human rights to Hong Kong. One element was explicitly
cultural, in that Hong Kong was understood as an only partially
modernised or semi-traditional Chinese society with its own distinct
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moral codes and ethical attitudes. A further factor in the waxing
and waning legal differentiation between the UK and Hong Kong
was active steps taken by the colonial government to meet perceived
exigencies in the Hong Kong situation, including social unrest and
strikes. Such measures were frequently of a repressive nature, especially
those concerning triad societies, sedition, public order, public meetings
(Regulation of Chinese Ordinance No 3 of 1888), freedom of speech
and censorship, (such as the Control of Publications Consolidation
Ordinance: 1951). Flogging and deportation were used as means of
political control (see Keller 1992; Klein 1997).

Often the human rights time-lag and the evocation of cultural
difference coincided in effect. In Hong Kong the death penalty was
formally abolished in 1993 (with the repeal of the Corporal Punishment
Ordinance), though it had been effectively suspended since the last
execution was carried out in 1966. The gap between these dates in
part represents deference to public opinion in the colony. In Britain
the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965 suspended the death
penalty for murder and it was formally abolished in 1969 (though not
until 1973 in Northern Ireland). Hong Kong’s Sex Discrimination
Ordinance was enacted in 1995, twenty years after the UK’s Sex
Discrimination Act of 1975.
In the case of racial discrimination the ‘time-lag’ is even wider: the
UK Race Relations Act was passed in 1976, whereas the Hong Kong
Race Discrimination Ordinance was only enacted in 2008. In relation
to the regulation of private, consensual sexual behavior, in 1865 Hong
Kong adopted verbatim the English Offences Against the Persons
Act 1861, which defined a set of ‘abominable offences’ (sections 4953). The Hong Kong Law Commission Report on Laws Concerning
Homosexual Conduct (Law Commission 1983) adopted the approach
of the 1957 Wolfenden Report, in that it accepted a disjunction
between moral judgments about private consensual behaviour and the
intervention of the criminal law (Law Commission 1983: 6-7). This was
HLA Hart’s position in his famous debate with Patrick Devlin on the
relationship between law, morality and the public-private distinction
(Hart 1963; Devlin 1965).
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One strand of the committee’s discussion was devoted to the
argument that toleration of homosexuality would constitute a Western
imposition on Hong Kong as a society shaped by traditional Chinese
morality. Given Hong Kong’s Chinese character, one view expressed
was that the government should adopt the stance of a moral leader. This
was acknowledged by the committee: ‘We respect without reservation
those who have urged upon us their conviction that Hong Kong is a
Confucian society, and that the role of Government is therefore to
set by law the moral tone for the community’ (1983: 4-5). This was
analogous in effect to Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of natural
law (Law Commission 1983: 5). The committee recognised that the
metropolitan centre might be seen to be imposing its moral liberalism
on a society which, if fully self-governed, would not have initiated such
a reform. It noted a parallel between Hong Kong and Northern Ireland.
But in response to assertions that homosexuality was not compatible
with ‘traditional Chinese concepts of morality’ (1983: 122), the report
documented in some detail discussions of homosexuality in Chinese
literature and historical texts (1983: 14). It concluded from a survey that
‘more countries in the region tolerate consensual homosexual conduct
by adults in private than penalise it’ (1983: 67-68).

The Sexual Offences Act (1967) decriminalised homosexual conduct
between males over the age of twenty-one; the same reform was
carried out in Hong Kong in 1991 by an amendment to the Crimes
Ordinance. This left the age of consent for male homosexuals at 21
in Hong Kong, whereas the age of consent for heterosexuals was 16.
This disparity is in contrast to the UK Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act
of 2000 equalised the age of consent. In a judicial review of s.118C
of the Crimes Ordinance (1971), the applicant in Leung TC William
Roy v Secretary for Justice sought a declaration that the difference in
the heterosexual and homosexual ages of consent offended the rights
to equality and to privacy under the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights.
To the government’s evocation of ‘the conservative attitude of the
Hong Kong community in matters of sexual mores’ (para 105), the
court retorted that in ‘a cosmopolitan society like Hong Kong “social
norms and values” change, often rapidly’ (para 106). The court’s decision
231
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that the age of consent was unconstitutional was upheld by the Court
of Appeal (Secretary for Justice v Leung TC William Roy), though the
government has to date not actually amended the text of the law.

In terms of the socio-legal modernity of Hong Kong, the colonial
government only gradually and reluctantly dismantled certain core
social institutions of pre-modern Chinese society. The Female Domestic
Service Ordinance of 1923 abolished the mui tsai 妹仔 system, whereby
young girls were sold by poor families as bonded maidservants. For
its critics, this system amounted to child slavery (Haslewood and
Haslewood 1930), though the girls in question were normally able to
get married once they reached adulthood. The 1923 law rejected the
notion that one could acquire property rights in a person in exchange
for a payment (section 2), though the institution persisted, since the law
only forbade new contracts. It continued to be the subject of campaigns,
government investigation and further legislative intervention (Jaschok
1988; Liu 1994; Sheriff 2000).
One underlying question was whether the institution, in its ideal
or canonical form, could correctly be termed ‘child slavery’, or whether
this was a pejorative label which masked anthropological ignorance.
The argument of its defenders was that, while it could be abused, the
system was in its essence philanthropic (see Pedersen 2001; Samuels
2007; Pomfret 2008). This debate was part of a much broader legal
engagement which involved the comparative mapping of Chinese
concepts and institutions onto Western, specifically English, ones.
However sophisticated (or not) the anthropological understanding of
the mui tsai system, the need was for a definitive label and a ‘yes-no’
answer to the slavery question.

Concubinage remained an officially recognised social institution
in Hong Kong until the Marriage Reform Ordinance of 1970. The
Republic of China had enacted a Civil Code in 1930 which defined
marriage as monogamous. A marriage was required to be formalised
by a public ceremony with at least two witnesses (Article 982). The
code made no direct reference to concubinage (Tran 2009). In 1950
the People’s Republic of China enacted a further reform of marriage
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through its New Marriage Law (新婚姻法), abolishing all feudal
characteristics of the institution. The Hong Kong law of 1970 stipulated
that after October 7, 1971 the only form of legal marriage would be
a registered, monogamous partnership (Lee 2000: 231; Lam 2004:
72-80), though existing traditional marriages were still recognised.

Forms of perpetual intergenerational clan or lineage-based
landholding such as the tso 祖 and the tong 堂 (Wong 1990), which
would otherwise have been invalid under common law principles
(in particular the rule against perpetuities), have been given formal
recognition by the Hong Kong courts (Tang Kai Chung and another v
Tang Chik Shang and others, 279):
a Tso may be shortly described as an ancient Chinese institution of
ancestral landholding whereby land derived from a common ancestor
is enjoyed by his male descendants for the time being living for their
lifetimes and so from generation to generation indefinitely.

One way that common law judges have sought to bring the tso into
the common law conceptual world is by analogy with the trust. But this
attempt to map this customary law concept onto the common law has
been rejected as muddling further an already confused situation (Merry
2012). The dilemma is clear: in order for a common law court to analyse
a particular factual scenario it is tempting to map a Chinese customary
law concept onto a familiar common law one. But a customary law
concept is by definition foreign to the common law.
5 Word meanings and cultural difference: the definition of
wife
Analogous difficulties arise in relation to family structure. The question
of how to define wife was a recurrent problem in the understanding
of traditional Chinese marriage and the institution of concubinage.
In Ho Tsz Tsun v Ho Au Shi and others (1915) the court made a strong
statement of the status and importance of ‘Chinese law and custom’ to
the Chinese inhabitants of Hong Kong (73):
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Nor is to be believed that a conservative people, like the Chinese, are
in the least likely to abandon their ancient system in a Colony where
they are in an enormous majority, and which is on soil which was once
part of the Chinese Empire.

In particular, China was a ‘polygamous country’ with a different
understanding of marriage family line and inheritance. It was evident
‘that the first wife has precedence, but that the other wives are wives and
not merely concubines’ (73). The alternative characterisation was that
the Chinese were monogamous. The judgment emphasized this point:
‘in Hong Kong great care has always been taken by the Legislature
and the Courts to draw a definite distinction between a wife (Tsai)
and a concubine (Tsip) and to apply the words “marriage” and “wife”
only to the former’. While a tsip 妾 was not a wife, the status reflected
a recognised social institution: ‘the status of a Tsip in a Chinese family
is recognised as very different from that of a mistress or kept woman,
who, indeed, has no legal status whatsoever’ (C G Alabaster, Attorney
General of Hong Kong, cited in the Strickland Report 1953: 137).

One case where an issue within the common law had to be resolved
with reference to customary law was Chan Hing-Cheung and others v The
Queen (1974). The question was whether the rule of evidence that a wife
was not a competent witness for the prosecution against her husband
applied to a secondary wife or concubine (tsip 妾), as opposed to the
principal wife (tsai 妻). The case was reducible to a simple principle:
‘Stripped down, the present effect of s.6 [of the Evidence Ordinance]
is that a wife may not give evidence against her husband, and vice
versa, in criminal proceedings’ (para 24). But was the witness a wife in
this relevant sense: ‘There can be no question that at Common Law in
England a “wife” meant the female partner of a monogamous marriage’
(para 25). The court recapitulated the various historical statements
about the limitations on the applicability of the common law, including
Captain Elliot’s proclamations. The question was whether the common
law was applicable to the ‘circumstances’ before the court:
The overwhelming ‘circumstance’ with which we are faced is that in
Chinese law and custom, secondary wives have always been regarded as
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lawful rather than bigamous. Concubinage continued to be recognised
until the 7th October 1971 and the status of existing secondary wives
at that date, including Madam Wong, continues to be recognised
(para 25).

The court found that internal evidence as to the status of the tsip in
customary law suggested she was a wife in the full sense of the word:
‘We have seen that Madam Wong is entitled to maintenance equally
with the principal wife, that her children are legitimate, that she would
be entitled to administer the estate of her husband, and that she is part
of the family’ (para 33). This was further buttressed by the decision
of the Privy Council in Mawji v R, where the rule of evidence was
extended to include any spouse in a potentially polygamous marriage
that was legal under the law of Tanganyika (para 35):
We see no reason to think that whatever may have been originally the
practical reason or reasons for the rule rendering spouses not competent
as witnesses against each other (reasons conveniently enshrined in the
Christian concept of the marriage union) those reasons which have
been suggested are not equally applicable to a Chinese customary
marriage. The fact that in some respects a tsip is of lower status than a
tsai and, therefore of the wife of a monogamous union does not affect
the basic similarity arising from the fact that she is a wife.

This went against some case law (e g In The Estate of Chan Yan
Deceased: 1925) where Sir Henry Gollan, C J , rejected the notion that
a tsip妾was the wife of the testator ‘if that term is used in its ordinary
meaning which limits its application to a kit fat [結髮 principal wife]
or tin fong [填房 principal wife on remarriage]’ (36). But in the absence
of any legislative intervention the Privy Council decision was binding.
The murder convictions were quashed. The common law, almost in spite
of itself, must here translate a culturally local and graded distinction
into an ‘either-or’ one (‘wife or not-wife’), in the process drawing an
analogy, via the Privy Council decision, with a marriage form in East
Africa. The distinctive Chinese institution is re-imagined through a
global common law understanding of other non-Chinese, non-modern,
non-Western forms of marriage.
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One can contrast these cases of foregrounded cultural difference
with one where the general law of marriage was at stake. In W v
Registrar of Marriages (litigated between 2010 and 2013) the issue was
whether a post-operative transgender woman (with a birth certificate
designating her as male) was a woman for the purposes of marriage in
Hong Kong. This was a classic human rights ‘time-lag’ case, in that
the authoritative case law in Hong Kong (Corbett v Corbett; Bellinger v
Bellinger) and related statutory provisions (the Marriage and Ordinance
1875; Matrimonial Causes Ordinance 1972) reflected a situation
now superseded in the United Kingdom by the Gender Recognition
Act 2004. This had been passed after the decision by the European
Court of Human Rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom. The Hong
Kong Marriage Ordinance provides ‘for the celebration of Christian
marriages or the civil equivalent thereof ’, and under the Matrimonial
Causes one ground for nullity is that ‘the parties are not respectively
male and female’.5 The Christian and the modern are effectively
fused in this legal framing, the implicit contrast being with Chinese
customary marriage.

The issue of transgender identity has offered a radical challenge to
the presumption of a universal conceptual language for the common
law. As Cheung J stated in the High Court, the question as far as
statutory interpretation was one of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the terms
man and woman. These are terms which one might assume to have a
single meaning across the common law world, a meaning which, once
ascertained, could then be applied to the law of marriage. The English
courts had used a mixture of biology and lexicography in arriving at the
decision that a transgender woman was not a woman for the purpose
of marriage, whereas in the Australian case of Re Kevin Chisholm J
asserted (paras 289; 311) that the ordinary meaning of man and woman
encompassed (post-operative) transgender identities (Hutton 2011).
This meant that, in terms of the fictional English of the law, these
words had a different ‘everyday, ordinary meaning’ in Australia than in
England and Wales. Given that there were no statutory definitions of
these terms, Cheung J treated the question in Hong Kong as a quasisociological or sociolinguistic one:
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Whilst it is quite true that a sex reassignment surgery is colloquially
referred to as a ‘sex change operation’ (變性手術), so far as the Court
observes, the reference to ‘sex change’ (變性) in the ordinary usage does
not, or does not yet, represent a general understanding or acceptance
that the person’s ‘sex’ (whatever one understands the word to mean)
has really been ‘changed’. I am therefore of the view that so far as the
plain meaning of the text, or the plain and ordinary meaning of the
relevant words, is concerned, the applicant has not established a case
that the relevant words, according to their ordinary, everyday usage
in Hong Kong nowadays, encompass post-operative transsexuals in
their assigned sex (para 140).

On the argument in terms of constitutional rights, the judge stressed
the distinct nature of Hong Kong as a ‘predominantly Chinese society’,
so that the required social consensus for a widening of the constitutional
right to marry was absent. This judgment defined Hong Kong society
as a distinct linguistic and conceptual space from other jurisdictions,
both more Chinese and, ironically, effectively more Christian than the
UK: the judgment dealt at length with the colonial-Christian framing
of marriage in Hong Kong (paras 114-116). The Court of Appeal upheld
the judgment in relation to Hong Kong usage in English and Chinese
(as well as on the related constitutional arguments) (W v Registrar of
Marriages):
There is very little evidence before the court regarding the ordinary,
everyday usage of the relevant words in this jurisdiction. The evidence
there is suggests that transsexuals are not generally referred to simply
as ‘male’ or ‘female’ or ‘man’ or ‘woman’ (para 71).

These statements about ordinary meaning are clearly at best
sociolinguistic and sociological fictions, and cannot be taken seriously
as descriptive generalisations.

What is exposed here is the artificiality of law’s inquiry into ordinary
meaning and the irrelevance of actual usage, even supposing it would
be possible to capture it. What is masked is the specificity of law’s
inquiry, since it asks for a definition of man and woman only for the
purposes of the law of marriage. On the one hand, this might seem to
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be the paradigm application of the ordinary meaning, since marriage
is deemed to be a key social institution; on the other, the adjudication
might be seen purely as a narrow inquiry for the purposes of law, which
has no authority to make statements about the ordinary meaning of
the terms man and woman for other purposes. This ambiguity shaped
the original common law decision in Corbett (1970), where the judge,
Ormrod J, sought to define the essence of human sexual identity: ‘It
appears to be the first occasion on which a court in England has been
called upon to decide the sex of an individual and, consequently, there
is no authority which is directly in point’ (105). The decision depended
on what he termed ‘true sex’ (89). At the same time the judge disavowed
any such intention, limiting himself to the requirements of the law of
marriage. At issue was what was ‘meant by the word “woman” in the
context of a marriage’, it was not the task of the judgment ‘to determine
the “legal sex” of the respondent at large’ (Corbett, 106)

The Court of Final Appeal in W v Registrar of Marriages (2013)
chose to stress the specific legal context of the inquiry into ordinary
meaning, thereby removing the question from the (quasi-)sociological
to the legal: ‘Our approach to construction has not proceeded on the
basis of some textual “ordinary meaning” but on the legislative intent
made evident by their enactment history in the light of the Corbett
decision’ (para 53). This had the effect of uncoupling the issue of
statutory interpretation from the constitutional argument, and freed
the judgment from the fictional constraints of an imagined Hong
Kong consensus about the meanings of the word man and woman. The
majority then aligned the law in Hong Kong with modern human rights
law, distancing themselves from the Christian ‘emphasis on procreative
sexual intercourse being an essential purpose of the matrimonial union’
and drawing on the dissenting judgment in Bellinger in the Court of
Appeal (2001): ‘the world that engendered those classic definitions [of
marriage] has long since gone. We live in a multi-racial, multi-faith
society’ (para 128, per Thorpe LJ).
The conservative-Chinese-Christian nexus that marked the High
Court judgment was emphatically set aside as the Court stepped
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beyond the constraints of the Hong Kong context to align the law
with international human rights trends. It pointed to the UK Gender
Recognition Act as a ‘compelling model’ (para 38). The messy
sociolinguistic issue of the ordinary meanings of man and woman
in Hong Kong usage (English and Chinese/Cantonese) was once
again submerged within the presumption of a unified language of
the common law. A dissenting judgment by Patrick Chan PJ however
insisted on Hong Kong as a distinctive conceptual space (para 188):
In my view, the present position in Hong Kong is quite different
from that in Europe and the UK when Goodwin was decided. While
there was evidence of the changing attitudes in both Europe and
the UK, I do not think there is sufficient evidence to show that the
circumstances in Hong Kong are such as to justify the Court giving
an interpretation to art 37 to include transsexual men and women for
the purpose of marriage.

The use of the word ‘circumstances’ resonates with the early colonialera discussions of the distinct nature of Hong Kong society (para 188):
As pointed out earlier, there is no evidence showing that for the purpose
of marriage, the ordinary meanings of man and woman in Hong Kong
have changed to accommodate a transsexual man and woman. More
importantly, there is no evidence that the social attitudes in Hong
Kong towards the traditional concept of marriage and the marriage
institution have fundamentally altered. Nor is there evidence on the
degree of social acceptance of transsexualism.

Following the decision in the Court of Final Appeal the Legislative
Council has begun debating how to respond to the decision, with the
Council divided over the scope of any legislation. Priscilla Leung Meifun, a ‘pro-establishment’ legislator, attacked recognition of transgender
rights: ‘Hong Kong is not a Western society and should not follow
Britain’s model, as this would lead to social chaos’ (Chui 2014). One
theoretical issue is whether the traditional rights and privileges of New
Territories, and lineage structure, would be affected by transgender
status, such as how an affirmed gender identity which conflicted with
the assigned category at birth would be understood in relation to
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patrilinear lineage structures. Would an indigenous person who had
been assigned a female identity at birth and who subsequently affirmed
a male identity, including undergoing Sexual Reassignment Surgery,
be entitled to build a ‘small house’? In the UK, matters pertaining to
peerages are exempt from the effects of the Gender Recognition Act
(section 16) (Jiang 2013: 69).

As a footnote to the High Court decision in W v Registrar of
Marriages, it is interesting to note that the judge, Andrew Cheung J,
also presided over a controversial decision concerning customary rights.
In Liu Ying Lan v Liu Tung Yiu and another the question at issue was
whether the surviving daughters of deceased parents, who had not
adopted a son to continue the male line, could inherit a property. The
court heard expert evidence as well consulting directly the Qing code,
both in the original and in translation. The father had died in 1943, and
the mother in 1987. Among the legal issues exotic to the common law
was the possible validity of the posthumous adoption of an adult carried
out by members of the lineage. There was one Hong Kong authority
to this effect from 1954, In the Goods of Chan Tse Shi, deceased, and a
powerful underlying cultural logic to this custom (para 49)
the rationale of the device to continue the male line is not difficult
to guess or understand by anyone with some general understanding
of the traditional Chinese society and its conventional or Confucius
values and thinking.

The judgment continues with a length quotation from Jamieson’s
Chinese Family and Commercial Law (1921), beginning with the
statement that (cited, para 49):
The foundation of Chinese society is the Family, and the religion
is Ancestral Worship. Ancestral Worship is not a thing which the
community as a whole can join in; it is private to each individual family,
meaning by family all those who can trace through male descent to a
common Ancestor, however numerous, and however remotely related.

Based on this understanding of Chinese society the judgment
explicitly adopted the view that the inheritance of the property by the
daughters was a solution ‘almost as a matter of last resort’ (para 55).
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While the claim of the particular male relative (a nephew) was rejected
(since he had already inherited property from his own father), it sent
the matter back to the lineage in order to allow time for another male
relative to be found or adopted. This judgment took its reference points
from a socio-legal imaginary radically at odds with the constitutional
framework underlying Hong Kong’s post-1997 legal order, with its
promises of equality before the law in the Bill of Rights and the Basic
Law. It envisaged a pure type of Chinese customary law, in which there
was no room even to debate flexibility and a context-sensitive solution.
One comment from the Strickland report seems pertinent here
(1953: 67): ‘It is somewhat disturbing that in nearly every case in which
the Courts in Hong Kong have had to inquire into Chinese law and
custom there has been conflicting evidence on some material point
with which the Court is concerned’ (see also Chan 1998; 2001; Chan
2013). A glance at an in-depth scholarly discussion of the nature of
Qing law suggests that reading the Qing text as if it were a common law
statute is a perilous undertaking (Su 1999). In the event, the decision
was reversed on appeal (Liu Ying Lan v Liu Tung Yiu and another), on
the grounds that the Adoption Ordinance (1972) had been intended to
bring an end to posthumous adoption under customary law (para 49).
In any case the High Court judge had been ‘over-cautious’:
Sixty years had passed since the death of the deceased. Apart from
the 1st defendant no one from the Liu clan had come forward and
made a claim to succeed the deceased. After the present proceedings
was commenced in 1992, no member had applied to be joined as a
co-defendant (para 69).

One can understand the Court of Appeal to be saying that the
original judgment had been ‘hyper-Chinese’ in its approach. In debates
over legal pluralism one important strand of argument has been about
the Romanticisation of nonstate, indigenous or ‘folk’ law (Galanter
1981; Sharafi 2008). In Hong Kong the other side of this coin is the
Romanticisation of colonial common law.
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6 Conclusion
In the history of the Hong Kong jurisdiction, questions of conceptual
and legal equivalence have arisen primarily in relation to marked or
foregrounded elements of traditional Chinese culture. In such cases
the issue is the mapping of Chinese concepts and institutions onto
Western, specifically English, ones and the reduction of anthropological
complexity to ‘yes-no’ distinctions expressed in terms of common law
categories such as: ‘wife or not wife’. But, for much of its history,
specific Chinese customs aside, Hong Kong has been treated as a
sub-domain of the universal common law jurisdiction (centred in
England and Wales). Principles of English law and the categories of
the English language (both legal and those of ordinary language) have
been applied as a matter of course to factual scenarios arising, to use
Cozens-Hardy’s words, in a world ‘beyond that, elsewhere’. This had
led to the ‘legal ghettoisation’ of Chinese culture, and a stereotyped
polarisation of the modern and the traditional characteristics of Hong
Kong society.
Postcolonial theory often attempts to resolve (or at least particularise)
the dilemma represented by colonial modernity by studying the
interface between the local and the global (Lee 2000; Merry and
Stern 2005) and by pointing to or imagining alternative, non-Western
modernities (for a survey and critique, see Dirlik 2013). In so doing, it
draws both on the ‘too much modernity’ and the ‘too little modernity’
strands of critique, but goes further to point out that notions of ‘the
traditional’ are formulated in a complex reaction to, and interaction
with, colonial modes of knowledge and governance. Colonial social
engineering in the name of respect for difference, it is argued, has led
to ‘an eternally frozen monolithic indigenous Han-Chinese culture’
which is understood as ‘essentially patriarchal’ (Chiu 2006: 50).

The irony of Hong Kong’s colonial legacy is that social progressiveness,
equality and freedom of individual expression is now defined in
opposition to ‘Chineseness’ (see Wat 2011). This ‘Chineseness’ is a
mix of re-imagined Confucianism and Leninist authoritarianism.
The notions of respect for hierarchy and patriarchal, monogamous
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family values are not greatly distinct from social, specifically Christian,
conservatism in the West. The representatives of this normative, statesponsored Chineseness include the same class of business tycoons
who formed the economic leadership of Hong Kong in the later
stages of British rule, as well as a political party strongly supported
by the authorities in Beijing, namely the Democratic Alliance for
the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB), and the Heung
Yee Kuk, the colonial-era institution set up to represent the ruralindigenous villagers.
As a result of the processes described in this paper, ‘Chineseness’
in Hong Kong is identified in the socio-legal sphere with everything
anti-progressive, as if this was an inevitable and fixed cultural fact.
Given this polarisation of rights discourse between a ‘non-progressive
Chineseness’ and the ‘progressive West’, and the importance of an
idealised ‘rule of law’ within Hong Kong popular imaginary (Tam
2013), it has become a logical tactic for the Court of Final Appeal to
seek to maintain Hong Kong’s alignment with UK law and thereby
reassert the conceptual unity of the common law, especially given the
impact on UK law of the European Court of Human Rights. And given
the surreal reinvention of colonialism as equivalent to international
human rights, it has become a logical tactic for disaffected young
people to wave the Hong Kong colonial flag and the Union Jack,
as a provocation to the ‘pro-Beijing’ Hong Kong establishment and
officials of the Central People’s Government (Cheung et al 2013). The
Occupy Central (Umbrella Movement) demonstrations, which erupted
in Hong Kong in late September 2014, are an evident symptom of
this polarisation of rights discourse and of the profound alienation of
many Hong Kong young people from the normative identity labels and
symbols promoted by the political establishment.
Notes
Christopher Hutton is Chair Professor of English at the University of
Hong Kong (chutton@hku.hk).
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I am most grateful to my colleague Professor Elaine Ho for insightful
comments on an earlier draft and to an anonymous reviewer for criticisms and
suggestions. I hereby acknowledge the support of Hong Kong RGC-GRF
award HKU745412H.
1

2

I am not referring here to ‘high’ jurisprudential debates about legal
interpretation but rather to the principles that common law judges appeal
to in mundane decisions when faced with a problematic term in a statute
or a contract, and the basic rules of legal interpretation taught to first-year
law students. The jurisprudential status of these assumptions is of course
highly contentious.

In recent years Chinese/Cantonese is increasingly being used as a language
of law, but as this article is primarily historical in focus this important
issue will not be pursued here.
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